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transformed legal theory, most notably as the understructure of 
critical studies, including critical feminism. 
Hermeneutic approaches undercut the distinction between ac-
tivism and restraint by implying that the idea of restraint as respect 
for the true meaning of a text is naive and that what the critic calls 
"activism" is the practicing judge's attempt at faithful understand-
ing. If it is possible to save the distinction from this widely accepted 
critique, Professor Wolfe gives no basis for such a salvage effort. 
Given the wide and growing gap between academic discourse about 
interpretation and the common rhetoric of restraint that gives "con-
servatives" their protective camouflage, it would be interesting to 
see a thorough and rigorous attempt to define and unseat judicial 
activism. Based as it is on naive methods and outdated assump-
tions, this book is not that book. 
WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND? By 
Larry Alexander' and Paul Horton.2 Westport, CT.: Green-
wood Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 169. $37.95. 
Thomas P. Lewis 3 
I 
This is a challenging, carefully written book, offered by its au-
thors as a guide to clear thinking about the nature of constitutional 
violations. 4 The authors contend that a "root" question, posed in 
their title, is presented in almost any case in which doctrines such as 
state action or "under color of law" are in play, but that a compre-
hensible answer is almost never offered by the Supreme Court. 
They are emphatic about their purpose. It is "conceptual, analyti-
cal, and exegetical in character, not argumentative or nonnative." 
They have no intention to answer their titular question with respect 
to any constitutional provision, and they refuse to take issue with 
any particular case. Under attack is the "conceptual morass" cre-
ated by the Court's failure to focus explicitly on the question they 
pose. 
They are agreed on several abstract analytical points. Three 
I. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
2. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
3. William T. Lafferty Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
4. I have exercised great care to describe the authors' positions accurately. Because 
their book is an elaborate but tightly written effort to touch all the bases created by their 
analytic framework, the risk of some distortion in a summary may be unavoidable. 
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alternative answers to the question posed by the title are apparent: 
(1) The Constitution commands only those persons who act in the 
role of lawmakers; they dub this the "Legalist model." (2) The 
Constitution commands not only lawmakers, but also those who 
perform governmental roles (the command being linked to their as-
sociation with government). This is the "Governmental model." 
(3) The Constitution commands everyone who is "within the juris-
diction of American law." This is the "Naturalist model." 
They are agreed that the Governmental model is "unprinci-
pled," with nothing that could generally suggest its acceptance ex-
cept a compromise between the "more extreme and principled 
'Legalist' and 'Naturalist' models." Additional "hybrid" models 
can be constructed from various couplings from among the "pure" 
models (and they do so), but these would be "theoretical monsters, 
perhaps even less principled than the Governmental model." Fi-
nally, they are agreed that as "between the Legalist and Naturalist 
models, one or the other-but not both-ought articulately to be 
settled upon as the presumptively correct answer to the question of 
constitutional referent, at least on a constitutional-provision-by-
constitutional-provision basis." 
The authors assert that the choice among their models has no 
bearing on the substantive merits of any lawsuit, but only affects 
such nonsubstantive issues as who the defendant may be, whether 
state and/or federal courts will be available for the suit, and what 
the grounds of decision will be. To illustrate: The adoption of the 
Legalist model with respect to a constitutional value (CV) means 
that any command embodied in the value is addressed only to 
lawmakers, including the sovereign's entire legal regime (substan-
tive, procedural, and remedial; written and judge-made; policies and 
practices underlying the implementation of laws). Since according 
to this model the CV does not command private individuals and 
governmental agencies or officials acting in something less than a 
lawmaking capacity, any duties borne by these actors would be non-
constitutional duties. Their acts could violate the content of the 
legal regime the sovereign has created in response to the CV, or be 
found to have been taken in accordance with an unconstitutional 
legal regime, but they could not violate the Constitution. 
Adoption of the Naturalist model in relation to a CV means 
that the CV commands everyone within the jurisdictional reach of 
the Constitution. "Everyone" includes lawmakers, so under the 
Naturalist model, to use an illustration of the authors, if a CV re-
quires the states to have laws against murder, this is because murder 
by anyone violates the CV. A murderer would violate a state com-
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mand and a constitutional command, for by hypothesis, the CV 
speaks directly to all acts. (Under the Legalist model, the murderer 
would violate only a state command required by the CV.) Simi-
larly, if a CV requires the maintenance of a legal regime for breach 
of contract, or for a range of torts, one who breaches a contract or 
commits one of the torts would also commit a constitutional viola-
tion, and the victim would have a federal case. 
Adoption of the Governmental model in relation to a CV 
means that the CV commands not only lawmakers, but also 
nonlawmaking governmental officials. Now if a CV requires the 
outlawry of murder, the commission of murder by an ordinary indi-
vidual would violate the state command but not the Constitution. 
But the sheriff who commits murder in violation of the state com-
mand would also violate the Constitution, for the CV speaks di-
rectly to the governmental official. 
It can be seen that since the Constitution speaks to the sover-
eign's legal regime under any model, the consequences of adopting a 
particular model are theoretically nonsubstantive and relate only to 
such issues as the appropriate forum and parties for redress of con-
stitutionally related claims. These are no small consequences, of 
course. Adoption of the Naturalist model, for example, would open 
the federal courts to a nightmarish docket of cases if they remained 
broadly available to adjudicate claims of constitutional violations. 
Actual cases offered by the authors as "classic" examples of a 
non-Legalist model include Screws v. United Statess and Monroe v. 
Pape. 6 In each case, governmental officers acted contrary to the 
sovereign's constitutional regime of laws. But because the Supreme 
Court ruled that their actions directly violated constitutional rights, 
a federal forum was available. These cases appear to fit the Govern-
mental model. Under the Legalist model, their conduct would have 
violated only nonconstitutionallaws that were constitutionally ade-
quate and a federal forum would not have been available unless on 
some other jurisdictional basis than for constitutional violations. 
Confusion resides among the Supreme Court's precedents, because 
coexisting with the above cases are the Court's "Legalist-model de-
cisions in Pa"att v. Taylor7 ... Hudson v. Palmers . .. Daniels v. 
Williams9 . .. and Davidson v. Cannon w . ... " 
Confusion is compounded, according to the authors, by the 
5. 325 u.s. 91 (1945). 
6. 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
7. 451 u.s. 527 (1981). 
8. 468 u.s. 517 (1984). 
9. 474 u.s. 327 (1986). 
10. 474 u.s. 344 (1986). 
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Court's insistence, Term after Term, on the idea that the "state ac-
tion" requirement is a real limitation on the presence of a constitu-
tional violation. Designed to eliminate claims that do not involve 
state action from the constitutional realm, the concept of state ac-
tion is "completely incoherent," because all action does involve 
state action. No matter how trivial an act and regardless of the 
identity of the actor, the act is either "legally forbidden, legally 
mandated, or legally permitted" by the state's legal regime. A con-
stitutional challenge of any act can therefore be formulated as a 
challenge of the underlying governing state law. State law being of 
the essence of state action, and being subject to constitutional scru-
tiny under any of the authors' models, the concept of state action 
has no conceptual role to play. Its use can only provide an incoher-
ent way of answering one or both of two questions: on the merits is 
there a constitutional violation?; and whom does the Constitution 
command (i.e., who may be sued, in what court system, on what 
grounds)? 
The book introduces an additional concept, a constitutionally 
based "remedial meta-regime," that qualifies virtually all that is 
said of the models. This is my understanding of their remedial re-
gime: A given model merely determines who can be a violator of a 
constitutional command. The remedial regime, grounded in the 
same values that underlie the constitutional command, determines 
the necessary or adequate remedies, and who shall be liable. Thus 
under the Legalist model the deprivation of a CV might flow from 
conduct by a government official and/or a private individual (are-
possessing creditor, for example) that (1) violates the state's consti-
tutionally adequate legal regime, or (2) comports with the state's 
constitutionally deficient legal regime. In case 1 the state's legal 
regime would provide remedies that are constitutionally adequate. 
In case 2 the remedial meta-regime would probably provide immu-
nity for the culpable parties-the lawmakers-but would require 
constitutionally adequate remedies against the individuals whose 
conduct deprived another of the CV, though their conduct was not 
in violation of the Constitution. 
Since in any case remedies would find their source in a given 
CV, Congress could give federal courts jurisdiction of suits to claim 
appropriate remedies or leave matters to the state courts. The latter 
would be obliged to provide adequate remedies in order to bring a 
state's legal regime into compliance with the Constitution, and 
would be subject to review by the Supreme Court. 
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II 
A 
Other readers are apt to share my admiration for the painstak-
ing thoroughness the authors have given to their goal of bringing 
"order, in the abstract at least, to the various categories of cases-
and the conceptual morass in which they are mired-that deal with 
the question of whom the Constitution commands." Nevertheless, 
if (to modify Holmes) the life of the law is logic leavened by experi-
ence, one can acknowledge the tight, logical symmetry of the book's 
analysis while regarding some of its premises and conclusions with a 
measure of skepticism. I might agree with the book, on its own 
terms, that the choice of model in answer to the root question, and 
that the abandonment of the state action concept, have no necessary 
logical "bearing" on the substantive merits of cases. Yet I have not 
the slightest doubt that experience with such choices would prove 
substantive effects to be inevitably linked with them. 
When I first encountered their approval of the Naturalist 
model as "principled," and their vigorous disapproval of the Gov-
ernmental model as indefensible, creating "insurmountable difficul-
ties" in application, because it is "unprincipled," my intuitive 
reaction was immediate and negative. Their description of state ac-
tion as a completely incoherent concept had the same effect, but this 
was familiar terrain that many others had ploughed before. I was 
confident that I understood where they were starting from, and I 
had remarked years ago that one's solution to the state action puz-
zle depends to an extraordinary degree on one's "starting place."II 
(I will return to this point in the discussion of state action in the 
concluding section of this part.) It took me a bit longer to appreci-
ate the connection between their characterizations of their models 
and a starting place they had marked out with respect to the Legal-
ist model. 
They start from a view of the Constitution they regard as "ar-
guably in accord with some common notions of what constitutions 
are about," including those entertained by its framers. As they see 
it, "The Constitution (or one of its provisions) either mandates the 
existence of a particular legal regime, prohibits the existence of a 
particular legal regime, or permits a limited number of alternative 
legal regimes." Because the Legalist model is included in their 
other models, this viewpoint is a fundamental building block of all 
the models. At first blush, their viewpoint seemed rather blandly 
logical. My second impression was quite different. 
II. Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960). 
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B 
Before exploring the connection just mentioned in relation to 
the Naturalist model, it is useful to consider some of the practical 
implications of that model. They footnote the observation that the 
Naturalist model "is very difficult to square with the linguistic for-
mulations of most constitutional provisions." They could say the 
same thing about its relationship to constitutional history and rec-
ognized principles of constitutional interpretation. It is clear, how-
ever, that they contemplate possible applications of the model far 
beyond those few instances in which linguistically and otherwise a 
command, such as the thirteenth amendment's, lends itself to Natu-
ralist interpretation. Rather, the model definitionally includes every 
act, private or other, that "violates a norm the Constitution 
prescribes." 
They do not mean that such norms as freedom of speech and 
religion, or due process of law, would apply to everyone in the same 
general sense that they are presently understood to apply to govern-
ment, else they could not insist that adoption of the model has no 
bearing on substantive issues. They do mean that every claim of 
right, privilege, etc., against a private or official defendant could be 
characterized as arising under the Constitution if: (1) the claim 
was based on state law and a substantial argument could be made 
that the absence of the underlying state law would render the legal 
regime constitutionally deficient; or (2) a substantial argument 
could be made that the claim, lacking a basis in state law, would 
have a basis in a constitutionally adequate legal regime. 
If isolated portions of a state's legal regime were to be evalu-
ated as pieces of its existing entire legal regime, it is predictable that 
many could be thought to be required for constitutional adequacy 
of the regime. The potential increase in constitutional cases would 
predictably lead Congress to redefine original federal jurisdiction so 
as to exclude the bulk of expected new cases. (In measured under-
statement the authors note that the model "poses a new set of diffi-
culties that relate primarily to the maintenance of a federalist 
regime and of clear jurisdictional boundaries between state and fed-
eral governments.") The task would be daunting, inasmuch as 
courts generally need to be able to determine their jurisdiction at 
the outset of litigation. But assuming that the Naturalist model has 
no logical bearing on the substantive outcome of litigation, it would 
not be surprising to see an effort to maintain a jurisdictional balance 
much like the present. Since conventional wisdom would continue 
to hold that mainstream constitutional norms run predominantly to 
governmental action, it is probable that adoption of the Naturalist 
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model, including as it does governmental officials of every rank, 
would lead to jurisdictional allocations that would seek to continue 
the treatment of individuals acting in their official governmental ca-
pacity as constitutional violators, while leaving private action dis-
putes where they are now. 
The Naturalist model may be principled in the minimum sense 
that it has a sort of abstract internal coherence. But the authors' 
conception of the Constitution does not provide a sound basis for 
accepting this model as a principled interpretation of the document. 
To say that the Constitution permits or prohibits some aspect of a 
legal regime is not to say, as I believe the authors intend to say, that 
the legal regime finds its source in the Constitution. State legal re-
gimes of criminal law, private property, contract and tort law are of 
course preconstitutional. They are not derivatives of the Constitu-
tion, though in some instances they are the subject of positive pro-
tections and limitations. They would exist without the Constitution 
as we know it, just as they exist in some form in every society we are 
willing to recognize as civilized, none of which has our Constitu-
tion, as we know it. The People and the founders surely brought a 
good many presuppositions about these legal regimes to the found-
ing, but they came with a fear, not a goal, of subjecting them in any 
substantial degree to federal definition.t2 
We are accustomed to working with concepts such as due pro-
cess and equal protection in the context of an existing legal regime. 
Subtraction of a portion of an existing legal regime may leave it 
constitutionally inadequate, but even in this limited context it is out 
of joint with our experience to think of the Constitution as the 
source of the legal regime. We are not accustomed to thinking per-
vasively about how much of a state's bookcase of statutes and 200-
year accumulation of common law precedents is constitutionally 
mandated/permitted. Any wide-ranging adoption of the Naturalist 
model might force us to think in these terms, if only to work 
through expected changes in jurisdictional allocations. Yet, if I 
were driven to think in the abstract about whether a state's legal 
12. This sentence illustrates a problem that I frequently encountered in my effort to 
interpret the book. The authors posit models as theoretical possibilities they insist have no 
bearing on substantive merits. They will surely read the sentence in the text as an unjustified 
conclusion from anything they wrote, because the Naturalist model is not supposed to open 
up any federal definitional role respecting state law that does not presently exist. The Court 
now defines and shapes state law, within limits, as it works with concepts such as liberty and 
property, and determines changes that are necessary to bring state law into conformance with 
the Constitution, as in New York Times v. Sullivan. I would insist, however, that it is aca· 
demic daydreaming to posit a theory that virtually all private law disputes arise under the 
Constitution, without acknowledging that the radically different perspective this provides will 
enlarge the definitional role of the federal courts. 
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regime of torts is mandated by the Constitution, I would be inclined 
first to ask: As compared to what? I don't have any idea how shift-
ing mixes of five Justices would think about such questions.t 3 
In trying to work through the authors' conception of the Con-
stitution, I can suppose that the Court might rule laws punishing 
burglary and related types of conduct to be constitutionally neces-
sary. This would make them constitutional offenses under the Nat-
uralist model, which includes governmental officials along with 
everyone else. I have difficulty thinking of that model as principled, 
when it would transform the fourth/fourteenth amendments from a 
limitation on search and seizure powers otherwise feared into an 
exemption from conduct otherwise prohibited by the Constitution. 
c 
It is evident in the book that the Legalist model is favored. 
There is a good deal to be said for a model of that sort, and I first 
suspected that their exegesis of the Naturalist model was their way 
of emphasizing the unacceptability of the Governmental model. 
This suspicion was overcome, however, by their assertion that either 
the Legalist or Naturalist model ought to be accepted as presump-
tively correct, as each constitutional provision is considered, and 
that these models are "theoretically more coherent and more defen-
sible than the Governmental model." For my money that put their 
indictment of the Governmental model in the strongest possible 
terms, until I realized that it rested on the same building block that 
led them to characterize the Naturalist model as principled. 
Again it will be useful to consider the implications of rejection 
of a Governmental model before exploring the connection just men-
tioned. Predominant in the authors' discussion of the Governmen-
tal model are "unconstitutional" acts by governmental officials that 
also violate the state's constitutionally adequate laws. For conven-
ience I will refer to this as model A. Their model, as well as the 
model presently employed in the courts, also reaches official acts 
that are in compliance with constitutionally deficient state law. I 
will refer to this construct as model B. In either application they 
regard the Governmental model as unprincipled. 
13. Consider DeShaney Y. Winnebago County Department of Social Sef11ices, 489 U.S. 
189 (1989). The Court rejected a claim that state government has a constitutional obligation 
to protect individuals from harm inflicted by private individuals. Addressing the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the Court said: "It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty or 
property without 'due process of law,· but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an 
affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through 
other means .... Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the 
State protected them from each other." ld. at 195-96. 
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The implications of a rejection of the Governmental model 
(adoption of the Legalist model) depend on any development of 
their remedial meta-regime, including jurisdictional allocations, 
that might follow rejection. As matters now stand, rejection of the 
model would mean that many (certainly model A) suits now within 
original federal jurisdiction would be remitted to state courts, where 
the claims would be violations of state laws. But in accordance with 
the book's remedial meta-regime, Congress could still provide for 
original federal jurisdiction, at least for model B actions in which it 
could be supposed in advance that the state's legal regime was con-
stitutionally inadequate. Lawmakers would be the culpable parties 
on this hypothesis, but they enjoy absolute immunity under current 
principles of constitutional common law.t4 The lesser official whose 
conduct precipitated the problem would have acted in accordance 
with the command of the state, but current doctrine and statutory 
interpretation hold the state immune from suit in federal court and 
supply no federal cause of action for a suit against the state in state 
court.ts Thus mere rejection of the Governmental model would 
still require remedies against the official. 
Under present law, a model B suit can be brought in federal or 
state court against the official in his official capacity for an injunc-
tion, and in his personal capacity for damages, including punitive 
damages. As I understand the authors' position, rejection of the 
Governmental model would mean that such a suit could be brought 
in federal or state court, depending on jurisdictional statutes, to in-
voke the remedial meta-regime as necessary to correct the state's 
deficient legal regime. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 could remain 
literally intact as a congressional expression of the remedial regime 
for model B claims.t6 They do suppose that rejection of the Gov-
ernmental model (adoption of the Legalist model) would overrule 
14. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). 
15. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
16. The authors write generally about government at the state level, and I am not sure 
of all they may have in mind for wrongdoing federal officials. When the Court recognized a 
constitutional cause of action against narcotics agents in the Bivens case (Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)), it was supposed that the alternative was a cause of action 
in state court (though probably removable to federal court for protective purposes) under 
state law. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority, expressed concern that a state's law of 
torts might not track fourth amendment law, i.e., that some conduct that would violate the 
amendment might not constitute a trespass or other actionable state law wrong. The authors' 
logic suggests to me that with rejection of the Governmental model (assuming the agents 
would not be deemed to be lawmakers), the relevant legal regime would be federal. Congress 
has not generally supplied remedies for deprivation of CVs by federal officials, and had not 
supplied one in the Bivens context. Since we are hypothesizing that the agents could not be 
constitutional violators, the remedial meta-regime would seem to call for the Court to create 
a remedy that would bring the federal legal regime into compliance with the Constitution. 
Given federal sovereign immunity, I am not sure how different from applying the Govern· 
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cases such as Monroe v. Pape, not simply as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, but as a matter of constitutionallaw.I7 
Their surface arguments for rejection of the model as unprinci-
pled are, roughly, as follows. The model requires a good test for 
distinguishing between a governmental official not acting in a law-
making capacity and a private citizen, in terms of their capacity to 
violate the Constitution. But there are no available criteria for 
making such a distinction. The lawmaker can make laws only be-
cause she is a governmental official; lesser governmental officials can 
act in ways that implicate CVs in their private or governmental ca-
pacities. Their acts are not significantly different, then, than the 
similar acts of private citizens. And since there is a large private 
sphere in the life of a governmental official, as spouse, parent, mem-
ber of church, union, club, etc., a good test is needed to distinguish 
those acts of the individual performed in an official capacity from 
those performed in a non-official capacity. Efforts to articulate dis-
tinguishing factors, which boil down to variants of three tests ("pre-
tense of authority," "agency," and "abuse of authority"), won't 
wash. 
Although I believe they are on to something, their specific ar-
guments strike me as counterintuitive with respect to model A and 
B claims, and as largely nonresponsive to model B claims. They 
challenge the above "tests" one by one. In their criticism of the 
"abuse of authority" rationale, they comment as follows on a state-
ment of the rationale in Home Telephone & Telegraph v. City of Los 
Ange/es:Is "After all, the ... ordinance in issue ... (which set 
telephone rates), if in fact illegal under the California Constitution 
as alleged, and if entitled to no presumption of legality, could just as 
easily be ignored by the telephone company as could an 'order' to 
lower telephone rates that was issued by a private citizen." (empha-
sis in original). They write as if they strongly believe this, which I 
find difficult to believe. 
There are acts whose nature can be comprehended only as the 
acts of someone who is plugged into the apparatus of government. 
Private citizens not wishing to be considered candidates for psychi-
atric examination simply do not presume to fix taxes, license cars, 
mental model this would be. The Bivens case is cited in the book, ch. 8, note 4, as a current 
example of the remedial meta-regime. 
17. Given the scope of Congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the Monroe majority's use of legislative history, it seems quite possible that those 
Justices could apply section 1983 in the same fashion a~ in Monroe, as a congressionally 
prescribed remedial regime for model A claims. 
18. 227 U.S. 278 (1913). This is a leading case for the proposition that a state official's 
action that violates state law can nevertheless be state action that violates the Constitution. 
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zone property, control rates.t9 Governmental officials who do such 
things in a manner to be taken seriously by others necessarily act in 
a framework of general governmental authority, even when their 
precise action runs afoul of laws enacted to keep them within con-
stitutional bounds. Their acts most often cannot be ignored, safely 
or otherwise, without the burden of a lawsuit, for the fact that the 
officials are plugged into the apparatus of government frequently 
allows, even mandates, a chain of consequences for the victim. 
This is not to say that the governmental official must be as-
signed constitutional duties, as well as duties under the laws enacted 
by lawmakers pursuant to their constitutional duties. One can im-
agine situations where private action has consequences for another 
that can be stopped only through a lawsuit. But the actions of gov-
ernmental officials frequently have a capacity to affect numbers of 
people far exceeding those affected by the typical actions of individ-
uals. And the Constitution does speak to the relationship between 
government and individuals in ways that it does not speak to private 
relationships. For these reasons I find quite unpersuasive their fiat 
assertion "that it is just not true" that governmental officials "by 
virtue of that status" have a "unique capacity to harm constitu-
tional values, even when they are acting contrary to state law." 
They add that there is no "principled test" for determining 
when a lesser governmental official acting contrary to the laws of 
her government can still be said to act on behalf of her principal 
(the government), and thus be characterized as an agent of the gov-
ernment. Nor will it do to emphasize that she is able to act under a 
pretense of authority. The agency problem stems from their as-
sumption that common law agency principles apply, at least under 
the "agency" test used by commentators and the Court. (They 
make the point that agency principles are inapt, inasmuch as they 
are designed primarily to determine a principal's liability, not an 
agent's). They believe the implications of the pretense of authority 
rationale present a fatal problem. For example, doesn't the test 
mean that "a rapist who lures his victim by flashing a fake police 
badge would be the subject of constitutional commands, while a po-
lice officer who engages in illegal government surveillance while in 
plainclothes would be acting beyond the reach of those 
commands[?]" 
All of their objections would seem to be most acute respecting 
19. This needs slight qualification. If private individuals are able under state law to 
accomplish these ends, e.g., effectively to "zone" property through the use of restrictive cove-
nants that outlast their ownership of the property, their results may be subject to scrutiny as 
the products of state action. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948). 
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the types of acts, unlawful under state law, whose effects might be 
characterized as realistically within the reach of private citizens. 
Police brutality, illegal arrest, unlawful search and seizure are ex-
amples. It does seem "incoherent" to suggest that such acts are 
within the scope of employment of the offending governmental 
official. 
But does the teaching of experience have anything to contrib-
ute to analysis? When police knock on the door insisting on entry 
followed by search and seizure, or break and enter in our absence in 
search of evidence, is this not the quintessential conduct forbidden 
by the fourth amendment? Should it make any difference whether 
their identity as police officers is initially apparent (it cannot influ-
ence the second hypothetical)? Are we driven by principle or logic 
in either case to conclude that it can only be trespass, perhaps bur-
glary, conversion or something else under constitutionally adequate 
state laws condemning such conduct, unless we are prepared to 
adopt the Naturalist model? 
To find the true basis for their characterization of the Govern-
mental model as unprincipled we must return to their notion that 
the familiar laws of a state-the basic ingredients of a state's legal 
regime-find their source in the Constitution. From this starting 
place, they suppose that if the official who commits an ordinary tort 
in his official capacity also violates the Constitution, a citizen's ordi-
nary tort should be treated similarly. In their terms, if the familiar 
law of a state addresses "constitutional values," it is not so unrealis-
tic to say that governmental officials lack "unique capacity" to 
harm them. And on principle one might contend an ordinary tort 
ought to be just an ordinary tort, or also a constitutional violation, 
without respect to the identity of the tortfeasor. 
Their view of the Constitution must account for their charac-
terization of cases such as Parratt v. Taylor2o and Daniels v. Wil-
/iams2I as Legalist model cases. In Parratt, state prison officials 
were charged with depriving a prisoner of property without due 
process when they negligently lost his mailed $26.00 hobby kit. The 
Court correctly treated with some contempt the idea that this was a 
case of constitutional violation, but based its reasoning on the prem-
ise that in the circumstances the state could hardly be expected to 
provide a predeprivation hearing. A similar result was reached in 
Daniels, where a jailer allegedly negligently left a pillow on a jail 
stairway, resulting in injury to an inmate. But Daniels picked up on 
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Parratt to the effect that neg-
20. 451 u.s. 527 (1981). 
21. 474 u.s. 327 (1986). 
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ligent official conduct does not "deprive" one of liberty or property 
in the fourteenth amendment sense. In each case the prisoner was 
remitted to state remedies, although it was unclear whether there 
was an available remedy in Daniels. 
If these are to be regarded even presumptively as Legalist 
model cases, it has to be because of an assumption that the wrong-
doers under either of the other two models would have been treated 
as constitutional violators. If they had, though, how would we 
characterize the resulting constitutional right? A constitutional 
right to be free of negligent injury to person or property? The exist-
ence of such a right would surprise most lawyers. Under the Gov-
ernmental model the characterization would include every official 
business automobile accident involving negligence, and under the 
Naturalist model it would include every automobile accident in-
volving negligence. For the authors the right would appear to stem 
from a conclusion that without a law of negligence the state's legal 
regime would be constitutionally deficient. They would surely 
agree, though, that the right would be traced to the due process or 
equal protection clause. 
I see the conduct in Parratt and Daniels as ordinary torts 
whether committed by a governmental official or private citizen. A 
state can not generally prevent negligence through the law of the 
land; it does not generally cause negligence through defective laws; 
and neither it nor the negligent official can provide any meaningful 
procedures before the fact of negligence. At the point of "depriva-
tion" there is no violation of a sensible reading of the due process 
clause. Even assuming the Constitution mandates a state's law of 
torts, the source of any right would be state law, and the availability 
of a state remedy should satisfy the most scrupulous interpretation 
of the due process clause. 
In this view, the Court's rejection of these cases as constitu-
tional cases is consistent with a governmental model, but not with 
the premise underlying the authors' Governmental modet.22 If their 
premise of the Constitution as an all-purpose charter is replaced by 
a more conventional and historically acceptable conception of the 
22. Daniels v. Williams is only one of several in a line of cases generally referred to as 
"Parrott and its progeny." Those cases have been the subject of an extraordinary outpouring 
of professorial analysis. The cases reflect an attempt by the Court to separate ordinary torts 
from constitutional torts, and the problem, which has stirred disagreement among the Jus-
tices, is more complex than my discussion of Parrott and Daniels suggests. In Zinermon v. 
Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990), Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, sought to rationalize 
the earlier progeny in a way that would preserve a governmental model. In my opinion, he 
was unable to account for one of the most troublesome of the progeny, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517 (1984). Three Justices joined Justice O'Connor in a dissent that states or comes 
quite close to stating a legalist model. 
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Constitution, a Naturalist model is unprincipled, and our choice is 
to abandon broad use of the Governmental model, or keep it but 
make a principled effort to distinguish ordinary torts from constitu-
tional torts. This latter alternative is what the authors conclude 
cannot be done. I certainly would prefer that it be done as a matter 
of statutory rather than constitutional construction, but it must be 
done if constitutional litigation is to avoid silliness under the model. 
We may find some encouragement in the fact that lawyers and 
judges do it without much fanfare as they work with the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. 
The authors suggest unprincipled decisionmaking in their at-
tack on the three "tests" discussed earlier. The tests may not hold 
all the answers, but they are, after all, just language. One might 
question the pedigree of one or more of them; or recall that they are 
employed in the alternative; or suppose that they should have mean-
ing only in the context of an actor who, having actual governmental 
authority, abuses that authority or pretends to specific authority not 
given. 
A private citizen dressed in the stolen garb of a police officer, 
despite appearances, is not an instrument of government. A plain-
clothes police officer acting in his official capacity is. In most cases 
it is not difficult for the private citizen confronted by a governmen-
tal official to discern whether the latter is acting in a private capac-
ity or as an instrument of government. It pays also to look 
occasionally at the text of the Constitution. It does not say a state 
cannot take property or deprive one of liberty or property. An indi-
vidual struck by a negligently driven police vehicle with its lights 
flashing can generally be sure she is the victim of the fault of an-
other who is acting in a governmental capacity. But without the 
help of a lawyer who has learned to think in artificial ways it will 
not occur to her that she was the victim of a constitutional wrong. 
She has been "deprived" of liberty and/or property, but not without 
any due process the state or the police officer was capable of provid-
ing before the fact. Subject her to a wrongful search and seizure at 
the hands of the same police officer, and no amount of logic is apt to 
convince her that she was not the victim of a constitutional wrong. 
As noted earlier, the authors appear to be most concerned with 
the Monroe v. Pape type of situation in which an official has acted in 
plain violation of state law. That situation presents a matter of stat-
utory interpretation (under color of law) as well as constitutional 
interpretation. Congress and the Court, in enacting and construing 
legislation, could well consider the authors' analysis of the Govern-
mental and Legalist models. They recognize that officials whose le-
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gitimate functions do not include lawmaking may nevertheless be 
regarded as lawmakers if as a matter of custom or practice or other-
wise they act in a manner that would make that characterization 
appropriate. The legislative history recited by Justice Douglas in 
Monroe v. Pape, in aid of his interpretation of the "under color of" 
phraseology in 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, provides more support for 
adoption of a legalist model as a general approach to statutory en-
forcement than it does for the Court's interpretation of the phrase-
ology.23 And in 1991, experience coalesces with logic and principle 
to support statutory implementation of CV s through more frequent 
resort to state courts, where state laws are constitutionally 
adequate. 
D 
There may be universal agreement among commentators that 
the Court's employment of the state action concept has been more 
confusing than enlightening in some specific cases. It may be sug-
gested, nevertheless, that survival of the concept is of enduring im-
portance to the liberties of the People. The reason is 
straightforward and simple: the Court's insistence, Term after 
Term, on behaving as if the state action requirement is a necessary 
ingredient of constitutional analysis is a continuing reminder that 
there are in our constitutional system pn"vate spheres of activity and 
decisionmaking quite distinct from governmental spheres. In posi-
tive terms, their behavior reminds us of the legitimacy of a more or 
less unanalyzed judicial tolerance for a good deal of private behav-
ior that the more enlightened among us might not endorse as our 
own, without explicit approval of the action, but with implicit ap-
proval of the need to allow a wide berth for choices that meaningful 
freedom requires. In negative terms, their behavior reflects avoid-
ance of a task for which they are not suited, and for which they 
have no adequate guidance beyond their own predilections: the reg-
ulatory fine tuning of private (nongovernmental) activity. 
The authors assert that there is no such thing as private activ-
ity that can be dissociated from government, since all so-called pri-
23. Cf. Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Sec-
tion 1983 Liability, 71 Va. L. Rev. 499 (1985). The positions stated in the text are not con-
trary to any I have taken before, as the authors' reference to me as a critic of Screws v. U.S. 
appears to suggest. I addressed the problem of that case in the context of then generally 
understood jurisdictional limitations, and stated the following conclusion: "Much can be said 
in favor of a Congressional adjustment of federal-state jurisdiction by fixing initial responsi-
bility for correcting abuses of state power in the state. It is something else for the Court to 
deny the power to Congress to vest jurisdiction in federal courts by a holding that unauthor-
ized state agency or officer action can not be state action." Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of 
State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083, 1087 (1960). 
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vate activity is either prohibited, mandated, or permitted by 
government. As they recognize, their analysis subjects every dis-
pute to characterization as a constitutional case. They recognize 
that "permissive" state laws, effectuated as they may be by comple-
mentary prohibitory laws (trespass and breach of contract actions, 
for example) present "problematical" cases of constitutional inter-
pretation. This is because "permissive" laws may have legitimate 
governmental interests in support of them-such as protecting indi-
vidual privacy, autonomy, and belief-that are lacking in analogous 
proprietary and prohibitory state action. That is only part of the 
story, and it puts the wrong slant on the part that is told. 
Bare logic, of course, provides support for the authors' ab-
stract. In a subtle but important way, however, their description 
puts the cart before the horse. It is fair to describe the American 
constitutional experience as one that started from broadly cherished 
ideals of individual privacy, autonomy and belief, grounded symbi-
otically in historical conceptions of private individual ownership of 
property and of freedom of contract. Changes in the content of 
these conceptions have stemmed, overwhelmingly, from the evolu-
tion of the common law in the hands of state judges; from enact-
ments of state legislatures, frequently building on foundations laid 
by the common law; and from enactments by Congress. The three 
sources are amply endowed with power. 
The state governmental "interest" in individual autonomy is 
not in any sense paternalistic. Our experience suggests it is a "gov-
ernmental" interest because a major motivating factor in the peo-
ple's formation of governments was to establish a framework in 
which the individual's interest in autonomy could be preserved. I 
cannot read the authors' description of the omnipresence of state 
action without thinking (in an alarmed, not facetious vein) of the 
old saw that describes a quite different, totalitarian or at least heav-
ily authoritarian state: Everything is prohibited, except that which 
is permitted. 
When emphasis is given to the principal forces in the forming 
of constitutional government and the preeminent civil rights that 
correspond to them, the constitutional issues foreseen by the au-
thors are "problematical," to understate the matter, because the 
Constitution was drafted with an eye to the relationships between 
the federal and state governments and between government and the 
people, not with an eye to private relationships. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court of the enterprise was not provided with any gui-
dance (because it was not provided with any mandate) for the regu-
latory fine tuning of private relationships. If one pays any attention 
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to the rhetoric behind the fourteenth amendment, to say nothing of 
its language, that amendment was similarly committed to defining 
the government-individual relationship against an assumed back-
ground of private autonomy.24 
The authors insist that their analysis has no bearing on the sub-
stantive merits of cases. In doing so, they write as if one could place 
a correctly marked overlay of constitutional law on a map of state 
or federal laws and see all the intersections, in the abstract, with 
nothing remaining but to work out the forums and parties for bring-
ing the overlay to life at a given moment. They are virtually alone 
in their position, for most others who have emphasized a similar 
approach to the state action problem have not addressed jurisdic-
tional or other such problems, but have had a substantive agenda in 
mind, namely, application of various fourteenth amendment and 
Bill of Rights commands or values to the individual.2s The authors 
do not endorse such an approach in terms, but they certainly would 
give the Supreme Court a free rein to "balance" the interests of the 
state in recognizing private claims to autonomy, etc. against the 
claims of others to "constitutional values." 
In an early piece on state action, Professor Louis Henkin of-
fered his version of a revised opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer, pro-
ceeding from a premise similar to that of the authors.26 His 
comment focused on "private" racial discrimination, and he dwelt 
upon balances the Court might strike between private claims of au-
tonomy and association and claims grounded in equal protection. 
He concluded that the balance might well be struck in favor of asso-
ciational rights only at the point where a state would have a consti-
tutional duty to protect those interests. In theory, then, the Court's 
task would be to decide exactly where a state court should have 
struck the balance in every conceivable clash between an actor and 
alleged victim in a racial context.27 
24. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, I Const. Comm. 235 (1984). The authors review the natural-law thought that 
was pervasive during the country's founding and later, from the 1850s through the drafting of 
the fourteenth amendment. Locke's views were still infiuential, as were the ideas expressed in 
the Declaration of Independence. Private contracts and property were prominent among the 
concepts claimed by influential writers of the times to be recognized by even a "higher law" 
than the Constitution. The ideal of equality was also prominent, of course. 
25. An extraordinary recent example of the phenomenon is Erwin Chemerinsky, Re-
thinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (1985). William Marshall, Diluting Constitu-
tional Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Action", 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 558, provides a 
cogent response. 
26. wuis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
473 (1962). 
27. Subsequent developments-federal and state statutes, education, and pressure 
groups-may well have carried us beyond the points most writers at the time would have 
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Racial discrimination has had a special history and constitu-
tional response. Enlarge the balancing assignment the authors 
would freely countenance for the Court to all the clashes that can 
occur between private parties, with anything resembling a constitu-
tional flavor to them, and imagine outcomes.2s Whatever they 
might be, they would emerge with the constitutional blessing of the 
Court, not always as required by, but at least as positively and after 
reflection permitted by, the supreme law of the land. In any event, I 
should think that the Court's creativity during the last thirty years 
would demonstrate to anyone the inevitability of linkage between 
substantive outcomes and afreely acknowledged power of the Court 
to embark on the balancing enterprise.29 
Much of the earlier writing about state action was energized by 
the special problems of private racial discrimination, especially with 
respect to privately owned public accommodations. The authors of 
the present book address a universe without limit: state action is 
omnipresent in relation to private choices, and the Constitution is 
omnipresent in relation to state action. The effect of their thesis, to 
use earlier language that was mostly my own, "would be to make of 
the Supreme Court an appellate common-law court for the nation. 
The Justices would be more nearly big brothers than 'elder cousins 
once removed.' "Jo 
The only way I can imagine that substantive outcomes might 
not be affected is to suppose that the Court, having abandoned the 
state action concept by name, would then choose to replace it with 
subsets, including one called significant state involvement, to place 
in the balance against some conduct claimed to be purely private in 
nature. That, I believe, is the state action concept as presently for-
mulated. The concept is more idea than formula. The authors le-
gitimately criticize broad use of a simple two-step analysis from 
which result appears automatically to flow from a declaration of 
state action or no state action, as in Shelley v. Kraemer. But while 
this shorthand method of writing opinions may confuse the reader, 
guessed would represent the abstract intersections posited by Henkin's formula. It would be 
interesting to know "what might have been" if in the 1800s the Court had freely pursued a 
balancing approach. My guess is that a good many more precedents than Plessy v. Ferguson 
would have had to be overruled to allow the progress we have seen since the 1950s. 
28. A reader needing help might consult Chemerinsky, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 547·57. 
29. About halfway into this period of the Court's history, Professor Henkin offered 
some biting observations in a larger context about the implications of "balancing as doc-
trine," though he recognized that balancing obviously has a role and can hardly be avoided 
altogether. Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1022, 1046-49 (1978). 
30. Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 S. Ct. Rev. 101, 129. 
The internal quote is from Paul A. Freund, Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought of 
Justice Jackson, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 9, 10 (1955). 
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it is not necessarily evidence of error or judicial confusion concern-
ing results. Professor Henkin had lots of company, including me, in 
the effort to rewrite the Shelley opinion, but those who sought to 
rewrite the result were a rare breed. I think that is true of most of 
the Court's state action cases.3I 
Unlike the authors, many who approve of their approach seek 
their own two-step analysis to desired results. First, pin responsibil-
ity on the state for private choices the state permits. Then reason 
that since the state is responsible, constitutional values directed at 
the state should pass through to the individuals. A favorite building 
block for the argument is illustrated by the authors' citation in sup-
port of their state action thesis of a long excerpt from another 
writer. The source wrote about family law, but along the way 
stressed the idea that courts cannot remain "neutral," but must 
make "constant political choices" in enforcing tort, property and 
contract law.32 I rather doubt the constancy of judicial feelings that 
hard nonneutral political choices face them in contract and prop-
erty disputes. Judges do, of course, choose whether or not to apply 
limits drawn from "public policy" to such disputes. The question is 
whether and when they should or must suppose that constitutional 
limits on government are relevant to individual conduct and 
choices, in addition to the more usual policy considerations they 
apply.33 
The authors apparently believe that courts must be tagged with 
31. The authors might take strong exception to this remark, citing a case that particu-
larly seems to upset them, Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Though they 
describe the case as one in which the Court found no state action in a State's UCC "grant of 
power to convey good title through sale by a bailee of a bailor's goods," they nevertheless also 
insist on describing that situation as "self-help repossession." They believe the decision is 
"indefensible" in light of other cases in which the Court has found state-assisted repossession 
and the issuance of a writ of garnishment unconstitutional unless provision is made for a 
predeprivation hearing. If anything, "self-help repossession" should present a stronger case 
of unconstitutionality. I wonder. Flagg Brothers did not involve "repossession" and there-
fore it did not involve the direct application of state power to effect a transfer of possession of 
goods or money from one to another. If these factors do not make a difference, then perhaps 
shoe repair and dry cleaning shops cannot dispose of unclaimed and unpaid-for goods with-
out a hearing, and there is no difference between their disposing of goods using up their 
storage space, and enlisting the assistance of the state in repossessing delivered but unpaid for 
shoes and clothing. Flagg Brothers may be inadequately reasoned, but it is not clearly wrong 
in result. 
32. Their citation is to Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 
18 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 835, 836-37, 842 (1985). 
33. It is not improbable that state judicial "political" sensitivities are alert in private 
interstate tort and contract disputes. The Dormant Commerce Clause, a source of restraint 
regarding "state action," confers "rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. 1983. Dennis v. Higgins, Ill S. Ct. 865 (1991). Since judicial dispute resolution is 
obviously state action, what accounts for the absence of a constitutional common law of 
commerce among the states, and the lack of any noticeable professorial concern for its 
absence? 
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responsibility in a way that will make most cases arguably constitu-
tional cases. They can still remark, as they do, that some conduct 
may be differentiated, depending on whether it is conduct by gov-
ernment or an individual. And they can maintain that results will 
not be affected, if only because they are in a position to say that any 
new results will be right or wrong. If wrong, that means faulty 
analysis; if right, that merely shows earlier analysis was faulty. 
They have that correct constitutional grid they can lay over state 
law. I don't believe it exists. 
III 
Whom does the Constitution command? In summary, and 
therefore in oversimplified terms, I would say most of its provisions 
bearing on civil rights/liberties command government, state and 
federal. The problem is figuring out what is government (though 
we should at least be able to agree that it is not individuals acting in 
a private capacity). In the absence of federal sovereign immunity 
and presently effective state immunity, liability for the deprivation 
of rights, though always traceable to human actors-legislators, 
judges, or members of the executive branch-would be asserted 
against government. If any of these actors exceeded his specific 
granted authority, while pursuing governmental ends or means and 
causing a deprivation, he would most frequently be in violation of 
tort and/or criminal law. In any case, his excessive conduct would 
present a problem to be resolved by his governmental employer. 
In the face of governmental immunities we have settled for 
some uneasy solutions that do not always promise fairness in appli-
cation, even if they may be regarded as minimally principled. Ex-
isting remedies under a governmental model include compensatory 
and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. 
When conduct of a governmental official is enjoined for constitu-
tional reasons, it is conduct of government that is stopped, and the 
official is enjoined in his official capacity. But when an official is 
soaked in damages for a constitutional wrong, liability depends on 
conduct committed in an official capacity, but is enforced against 
her only in her personal capacity. 
Personal liability appears to be most justifiable when the offi-
cial has also violated state law. Even then, however, the official will 
find himself to be a defendant in a lawsuit because of conduct per-
formed in an official capacity that he would not have had any occa-
sion to commit as a private citizen. Frequently his conduct will be 
second-guessed with unhurried hindsight by others who see its justi-
fication differently than he did in the heat of the battle. He may be 
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hit with punitive damages by a jury whose threshold of indignation 
has reached new lows in our ongoing quest for perfection. If he is 
lucky after possibly years of litigation, he may be determined to 
have satisfied the standards of qualified immunity.34 The problem is 
magnified under what I have designated Governmental model B. 
There the official is carrying out the law of the state, albeit unconsti-
tutional law. She is acting as the agent of the state. There is no 
pretense or abuse of the authority the state has settled upon her and 
expects her to discharge. We can hardly expect lower-level officials 
generally to refuse any part in the enforcement of "wrongful" laws, 
unless we expect them to resign their employment. We are not talk-
ing Nazi war crimes in these cases. Yet the official may be sued for 
damages, including punitives, in her individual capacity, but only 
for wrongs committed in her official capacity. Unlike the private 
individual who may incur liability for conduct in accordance with 
unconstitutional state law, the official will not have realized any 
personal gain from the conduct. It is not wholly satisfying to sup-
pose that the state most likely will stand in for the defendant and 
pay any damages that are assessed, for the individual should not be 
subjected to the vicissitudes of budgetary judgments by politicians. 
The authors do not confront these problems. They conclude 
that model B officials can be held personally liable pursuant to their 
constitutional remedial meta-regime, which they find to be more 
principled than saying the officials have constitutional duties. Their 
Legalist model assigns constitutional duties to lawmakers, who are 
now protected from liability by judicially created immunity. Under 
their abstract lawmakers can on principle be assigned constitutional 
duties, but be shielded from liability; the executive not acting in a 
lawmaking capacity cannot, on principle, be assigned constitutional 
duties, but he can be held personally liable for deprivations of con-
stitutional values. 
I have no quarrel with legislative immunity. I do fail to under-
stand why it is principled to assign lawmakers, but not executives, 
constitutional duties. If legislative immunity were to be removed, I 
would have the same problem with holding lawmakers personally 
liable for offenses they can commit only as lawmakers that I have 
with holding the executive personally liable. Ideally liability ought 
to track capacity. But to hold any governmental official liable for 
damages only in his official capacity would of course be to hold 
government liable. 
I recommend this book to all who are even slightly interested 
34. This problem is probably most acute in situations where the law is clear, but fact-
specific situations call for judgments about sometimes subtle issues. 
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in the problems it attacks. I think it has clarified my thinking, but I 
know it has stimulated it. I have quarreled with parts of their the-
sis, but I nevertheless admire the elegant care the authors gave to its 
development. 
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION. By Richard A. 
Posner'. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. xii, 
156. Cloth, $20.00. 
Michael E. Parrish 2 
He didn't write "hard cases make bad law," "the power to tax 
is the power to destroy," or "the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 
But he did pen other famous aphorisms such as: 
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to 
relief .... The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may 
not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as 
if he had.J 
The criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.4 
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as 
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.s 
He was, Richard Posner suggests, perhaps our most literary 
judge. 
For those who have long felt that Benjamin Cardozo was a 
great judge--perhaps the greatest common law jurist to sit on an 
American court in the twentieth century-Posner offers some per-
suasive confirmation in this short, meaty book, based on his 1989 
Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan. And the book will 
also fortify the reputation of Judge Posner, a founder of the law and 
economics school, as perhaps the most prolific sitting jurist since 
Cardozo himself. He has produced at least three substantial books 
while carrying a full judicial load on the Seventh Circuit, a level of 
productivity seldom matched in the academic world-and one 
likely either to swell the judge's reputation in that world or engen-
I. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
2. Professor of History, University of California, San Diego. 
3. Wagner P. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 437 (1921). 
4. People P. Deford, 242 N.Y. 13, !50 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). 
5. Berkey P. Third Apenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, !55 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
